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Abstract
There is growing worldwide concern that the rampant spread of digital fake news (DFN) via new media technologies is detri-
mentally impacting Democratic elections. However, the actual influence of this recent Internet phenomenon on electoral deci-
sions has not been directly examined. Accordingly, this study tested the effects of attention to DFN on readers’ Presidential 
candidate preferences via an experimental web-survey administered to a cross-sectional American sample (N = 552). Results 
showed no main effect of exposure to DFN on participants’ candidate evaluations or vote choice. However, the perceived 
believability of DFN about the Democratic candidate negatively mediated evaluations of that candidate—especially amongst 
far-right ideologues. These results suggest that DFN may at worst reinforce the partisan dispositions of mostly politically 
conservative Internet users, but does not cause or induce conversions in these dispositions. Overall, this study contributes 
novel experimental evidence, indicating that the potential electoral impact of DFN, although concerning, is strongly condi-
tional on a reciprocal interaction between message receptibility and a pre-existing right-wing ideological orientation. The 
said impact is, therefore, likely narrow in scope.
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1 Relatedly, the use of concerted DFN campaigns was observed in, 
amongst other democratic electoral contexts, the lead up to the UK’s 
referendum to leave the European Union and 2016 municipal elec-
tions in Brazil (Arnaudo 2017).
1 Introduction
Following the 2016 Presidential election victory of Donald 
Trump, several journalists and politicians argued that the 
widespread circulation of digital fake news (DFN) via new 
media technologies played a decisive role in influencing 
votes and turnout (Mustafaraj and Metaxas 2017; Tandoc 
et al. 2017). This notion has been given further credence 
by accusations from American intelligence officials that 
the Russian government honed and sponsored a sophisti-
cated bombardment of DFN through Facebook and Twit-
ter to sway the election in Trump’s favor. These factors 
have thus stoked public concern over the possibility that 
DFN can now be used as an effective weapon to undermine 
democratic elections across the globe (Vargo et al. 2018).1 
Consequently, governments and media companies are devel-
oping high-tech algorithmic counter-measures to mitigate 
the spread of political DFN campaigns (Nelson and Taneja 
2018). For example, Facebook and Twitter have purported 
that they have enhanced their machine learning protocols to 
better detect and remove DFN accounts and postings (Haci-
yakupoglu et al. 2018).
However, these concerns and pre-emptive responses are 
currently mostly grounded on speculation rather than sub-
stantiated empirical evidence. That is, and due largely to 
the relative recency of this phenomenon, whether DFN can 
actually and negatively affect people’s attitudes towards and 
decisions to vote for a politician running for office has yet to 
be empirically tested let alone confirmed. To date, and while 
highly insightful, the few available scientific studies on DFN 
have mostly either only looked at the spread and usage of 
DFN during the 2016 US Presidential election (e.g.,  Guess 
et al. 2018; Nelson and Taneja 2018), or examined factors 
that increase a reader’s receptivity to DFN messages (e.g., 
Allcott and Gentzkow 2017;  Pennycook et al. 2017).
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Therefore, to help fill this empirical gap, the present 
online survey experiment tested the direct effects of expo-
sure to DFN on evaluations of and intentions to vote for 
two major US Presidential candidates. Furthermore, this 
experiment additionally tested for indirect media effects by 
examining mediated relationships and interactions between 
DFN exposure, the perceived believability of DFN, and par-
tisan ideology. In doing so, this study helps to address the 
need for more complex conceptualizations of and research 
on how pertinent reading contexts and individual character-
istics can mediate and/or moderate news media’s capacity 
to affect attitudes and behaviors (Borah 2011, Newton 2019; 
Slothuus and De Vreese 2010). Accordingly, the article pro-
ceeds as follows. First, we review the relevant political com-
munications literature and DFN research that informed this 
study’s theoretical foundations and hypotheses. Next, we 
discuss this study’s methods, findings, contributions, and 
limitations.
2  Theorizing the potential attitudinal 
effects of DFN
DFN is generally defined in the literature as non-satirical 
and deliberately fabricated news stories that are designed 
to appear credible, and disseminated through the Internet to 
generate advertising revenue and/or influence people’s poli-
tics (Guess et al. 2018; Haciyakupoglu et al. 2018; Nelson 
and Taneja 2018; Tandoc et al. 2017). Whilst this is per-
haps an overly broad definition, it is important to note that, 
as Vargo et al. (2018) argue, DFN is not the same as “bad 
reporting and ideologically driven news that is uncongenial 
to one’s views” (p. 2031). Furthermore, DFN stories are typ-
ically full-fledged articles from dedicated host websites that 
are largely distributed through prominent social network-
ing sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Although, DFN can 
also take the form of organized ‘Twitter bombs’ (i.e., post-
ings of numerous Tweets with the same or similar content 
from multiple accounts). Additionally, DFN content usually 
contains eye-catching headlines, provocative imagery, and 
defamatory accounts about a person, group, or event. In the 
specific context of government elections, DFN articles or 
social media posts tend to feature demonstrably false claims 
about a candidate or party’s supposed policy positions, cor-
ruption, criminal activities, biases, discriminatory intents, 
or legislative agenda (Mustafaraj and Metaxas 2017; Penny-
cook et al. 2017). Hence, political DFN content is effectively 
honed clickbait that is intentionally framed to sway people’s 
sociopolitical thoughts and practices by appealing to their 
emotions and sense of indignation (Nelson and Taneja 2018; 
Vargo et al. 2018).
This naturally raises the question: can DFN actually 
influence a reader’s attitudes towards and decision to vote 
for a given candidate? As stated earlier, this question has 
yet to be directly tested, but the extensive media framing 
and priming literature offer applicable insights that point 
to a couple of plausible answers. For example, studies have 
shown that exposure to negative and sensationalistic word-
ing and imagery, such as those commonly found in politi-
cal attack ads or tabloid headlines, capture attention, and 
stimulate emotional reactions more strongly than neutral 
stimuli. The combination of these elicited affective and cog-
nitive reactions mediates what information is believed and 
learned (Gibbons et al. 2005), which may then affect candi-
date evaluations and voting intentions (Balmas and Sheafer 
2010; Chang 2001). To elaborate, exposure to emotionalized 
media content can concurrently activate frame–consistent 
memory associations and emotions. This then leads “to an 
intensification of the mood state; rendering mood-related 
thoughts and memories more accessible than unrelated cog-
nitions” (Baumgartner and Wirth 2012, p. 5). As a conse-
quence, fewer cognitive resources are left available for the 
processing of peripheral or discordant information; making 
it difficult to counterargue and not be implicitly influenced 
by the intended media message (Arendt 2013; Matthes and 
Schmuck 2017). Ergo, the more a news story’s presentation 
of information induces fear, anger, contempt, or anxiety, the 
more its message can subliminally inflect a reader’s opinions 
of and support for certain candidates and their policy plat-
forms (Brader et al. 2004; Seate and Mastro 2017). In light 
of this research, and taking into account that political attack 
ads and tabloid articles are arguably the precursors to, and 
are, in many ways, similar in terms of content presentation 
style and tone as, DFN, then one can reasonably draw the 
conclusion that DFN has at least the potential to negatively 
affect electoral-related attitudes and decisions.
That said, several studies also show that the effects of 
news media on political opinions and behaviors, in particu-
lar, are strongly dependent on several situational reading 
contexts and individual-level characteristics (Feldman 2011; 
Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Matthes and Schmuck 
2017). Of these varying moderating and mediating factors, 
the most relevant to the present study are news message 
believability and partisanship. The importance of the for-
mer factor is fairly straightforward. Put simply, if a reader 
accepts a political news message as accurate and credible, 
then the likelier it is that the presented information will 
become encoded and utilized to interpret and evaluate a 
subsequently encountered and related attitude object. Con-
versely, the less the message is trusted, the less likely it is to 
inform a reader’s beliefs and judgments (Miller and Kros-
nick 2000; Moy et al. 2016). However, the extent to which 
readers believe or disbelieve political news information can 
be additionally contingent on the direction and extremity of 
their partisanship (Arpan and Raney 2003; Newton 2019).
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To wit, if a political news article’s source cues or issue 
framings are recognized as trustworthy and congruent with 
perceiver political predispositions, then the higher the prob-
ability is that its information will be uncritically accepted 
and vice versa (Arpan and Raney 2003; Haider-Markel and 
Joslyn 2001; Moy et al. 2016). Two leading explanations for 
this, respectively, posit that: (1) people are cognitive misers. 
Therefore, to save time and mental energy, they avoid effort-
ful and controlled reasoning; preferring instead to rely on 
peripheral information and heuristics to make quick evalu-
ations and decisions. (2) People are also inclined to hold 
on to and rationalize their firm and long-held beliefs when 
faced with counter-attitudinal information—a phenomenon 
known as motivated reasoning.2 These cognitive and psy-
chological tendencies mean that rather than carefully weigh 
and examine the argumentative merits and evidence of a 
political news report, readers will normally form immedi-
ate conclusions based largely on the extent to which the 
available source cues and message frames align with their 
existing ideological orientations and preconceptions. This 
is especially the case for hyper-partisan readers (Newton 
2019; Slothuus and De Vreese 2010). Of course, instances 
of political news exposure—irrespective of the presented 
information’s veracity—may, in some cases, lead to changes 
in the valence and content of a reader’s existing memory-
stored schema networks and associations (Lecheler and De 
Vreese 2011). Nevertheless, most instances of news expo-
sure usually result in a bias towards reinforcing rather than 
converting pre-established beliefs and opinions (Igartua and 
Cheng 2009; Igartua et al. 2012).
Correspondingly, a parallel body of selective-exposure 
research shows that people prefer and spend more time 
reading online news content with opinion-reinforcing over 
opinion-challenging information. These news attention 
and consumption habits thus only serve to solidify read-
ers’ political identities (Garrett 2009; Graf and Aday 2008; 
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2011). Coincidently, the 
few studies on DFN also seem to indicate that exposure 
to DFN has at most a reinforcing effect on readers’ candi-
date preferences. A survey study by Allcott and Gentzkow 
(2017), for example, found that in the 2016 US election, 
people were considerably more likely to believe DFN that 
favored their preferred candidate. Other studies further show 
that during this election, DFN audiences were very small 
and highly concentrated (Nelson and Taneja 2018), with 
nearly six out of ten visits to DFN sites (the majority of 
which were politically conservative), coming from 20% of 
the most right-wing online users (Guess et al. 2018). Relat-
edly, robust experiments conducted by Pennycook and Rand 
(2019) showed that the overall capacity to discern Republi-
can-consistent or Democrat-consistent real from fake news 
was lower among participants who supported Donald Trump 
over Hillary Clinton, relative to those who supported Clinton 
over Trump. As can be inferred from Pennycook and Rand’s 
(2019) arguments, a plausible reason for these curious out-
comes is that conservative participants automatically drew 
on their pre-existing partisan schemas and corresponding 
gut feelings to heuristically judge the accuracy of the DFN 
headlines which they were exposed to. Liberal participants, 
on the other hand, tended to engage in analytical thinking, 
which enhanced their ability to deliberate on and accurately 
ascertain the truthfulness of the presented DFN claims.
When considered together, the existing research on media 
effects and DFN hence raises doubts as to whether DFN 
can affect changes in people’s candidate attitudes and cor-
responding voting behaviors. More to the point, the stud-
ies outlined above indicate that attention to DFN at most 
reifies audiences’ pre-existing partisan attitudes and voting 
intentions, and only if this DFN features attitude-consistent 
information. Exposure to counter-attitudinal DFN is, there-
fore, unlikely to induce conversions in reader’s candidate 
preferences. Furthermore, these reinforcement effects may 
be stronger for right-wing than for left-wing readers. To reit-
erate, this is because when faced with persuasive political 
appeals and relative to liberals, conservatives are more prone 
to employing heuristic over systematic information-process-
ing and be implicitly persuaded via evaluative conditioning 
(Jost and Krochik 2014). Conservatives also generally limit 
their exposure to novel stimuli and are likelier to accept the 
credibility of and spread and attend to DFN (Guess et al. 
2018; Mele et al. 2017; Pennycook and Rand 2019). In tan-
dem, these cognitive and behavioral traits can reduce con-
servatives’ information gain and “probability of correcting 
invalid assumptions of negativity”, which can lead them to 
hold a “greater number of negative attitudes [..] than liber-
als” (Shook and Fazio 2009, p. 2). Consistent with all these 
empirical observations, conservatives should be more credu-
lous towards DFN about a candidate from a rival party than 
their counterparts. This combination of fake news message 
receptibility and right-wing ideology may then generate an 
interaction effect potent enough to significantly lower the 
evaluation and likelihood of voting for a said rival candidate. 
Hence, based on everything discussed so far, the following 
hypotheses are proposed and tested in the American context.
2 Heuristic processing and motivated reasoning, respectively, entail 
Type-1 (e.g., fast and automatic) and Type-2 (e.g., slow and deliber-
ate) modes of information-processing. Despite these differences, both 
processes can work to reinforce established beliefs and attitudes. Spe-
cifically, heuristic processing is often activated when encountering 
congruent information (Igartua and Cheng 2009). Motivated reason-
ing tends to be activated when encountering incongruent information 
that induces cognitive dissonance, which is then often resolved by 
actively rationalizing one’s existing beliefs and/or attitudes to main-
tain cognitive consistency (Petersen et al. 2013).
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(H1) Exposure to DFN about a Democratic or Repub-
lican Presidential candidate (as compared to exposure 
to neutral news stimuli) will, ceteris paribus, have no 
direct effect on evaluations of nor on intentions to vote 
for the respective candidate.
(H2) The perceived believability of anti-Democrat 
DFN will be higher for conservatives than for leftists.
(H3) The perceived believability of anti-Republican 
DFN will not significantly differ by partisan orienta-
tion. Put differently, leftists will be no more likely than 
conservatives to accept the claims of anti-Republican 
DFN content.
(H4) In participants exposed to anti-Democrat DFN 
(as compared to those exposed to neutral news stim-
uli), the interaction between news message believabil-
ity and partisan orientation will lead to decreases in 
the opinions of and voter support for the Democratic 
candidate—particularly amongst participants with 
right-wing orientations (see Fig. 1).
(H5) In participants exposed to anti-Republican DFN 
(as compared to those exposed to neutral news stim-
uli), the interaction between news message believabil-
ity and partisan orientation will have no effect on the 
opinions of or voter support for the Republican candi-
date, i.e., in these contexts, no significant differences 
will be observed between leftists and conservatives.
3  Methodology
This study utilized a between-subject experimental web-
survey design (treatment vs. control), with two treatment 
conditions. Participants were first presented with an online 
consent form that masked the purpose of the study as a 
test on whether people’s online reading habits, attention 
spans, and information retention differed by demographic 
characteristics. Following this, they filled in pre-test demo-
graphic, political psychographic, and media consumption 
measures. They were then randomly assigned to either a (1) 
anti-Clinton DFN treatment condition, (2) anti-Trump DFN 
treatment condition, or (3) control condition, and exposed to 
study materials via a questionnaire packet with the outcome 
measures presented at the end of the survey.
3.1  Participants
The surveying agency Qualtrics was commissioned to 
recruit participants during February 2018. Data were col-
lected from 552 American residents aged 25–49 (M = 36.3, 
SD = 6.9 years). Participants from these ages were selected, 
because they are likelier to vote than younger cohorts (Cas-
tillo 2016), and more likely to use new media than older 
cohorts. As such, they provide an arguably ideal vantage 
point from which to gage the potential effects of DFN on 
electoral decisions. The sample was 48.6% (female) and 
51.4% (male), and 78.1% (White), 8% (African-American), 
6% (Latino/Hispanic), 6.5% (East Asian), and 1.4% (Other). 
Moreover, 3.3% reported having received a (high-school 
education or less with no diploma), 34.4% had a (high-
school diploma or GED), 12.3% had an (Associate of Arts 
degree), 33.5% had a (Bachelor’s degree), and 16.5% had a 
(Master’s degree or higher). Additionally, 11.1% reported 
having an annual family income of between (0–$20,000); 
with 22.8% reporting ($20,001–$40,000), 21% reporting 
($40,001–$60,000), 17.2% reporting ($60,001–$80,000), 
10.7% reporting ($80,001–$100,000), and 17.2% reporting 
($100,001–over).
3.2  Procedure
In all, 184 participants were randomized into the anti-Clin-
ton DFN condition, 167 into the anti-Trump DFN condition, 
and 201 into the control condition. Following their randomi-
zation, participants completed three reading tasks that were 
disguised as attention-memory tests and presented across 
the questionnaire in between several filler items. Before each 
task, a pop-up note informed participants that they would 
be shown random social media news feed posts or online 
news articles, and then asked a question on what was dis-
played. Participants were asked three post-task questions, 
and those who answered any of these questions incorrectly 
had their sessions automatically ended and data deleted. 
This admittedly strict protocol was taken based on three 
important methodological considerations. First, unlike in 
a standard laboratory experiment, researchers conducting 
web-survey experiments cannot control external distractions 
or be certain that participants are sufficiently engaging with 
the presented tasks. Second, as Maniaci and Rogge (2014, p. 
75) argue, “inattentive participants might not be affected by 
text-based manipulations, potentially adding error variance 
to the effects and thereby obscuring meaningful results”. 
Third, inattentive responding can adversely affect statistical 
Fig. 1  Hypothesized conditional process model (right-wing orienta-
tion refers here to both economically and socially conservative ideo-
logical leanings)
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analyses and generate spurious results (Maniaci and Rogge 
2014). The aforementioned protocol, therefore, helps to 
ensure that the data set was comprised of participants who 
evidenced adequate news stimuli encoding. We deemed 
meeting this condition critical, so that in the event of finding 
significant treatment effects, we could be more confident that 
these stemmed from attention to the experimental stimuli 
materials.
Accordingly, for the first task, participants were instructed 
to read two Facebook news feed posts (each displayed sepa-
rately). For the second and third tasks, participants read a 
short online news article. Additionally, participants were 
later in the questionnaire shown an additional Facebook 
newsfeed post that was displayed for 5 s. This served to 
further prime participants in the treatment conditions with 
either negative framings of Clinton or Trump. In all, every 
participant attended to two short news articles and three 
Facebook posts. Finally, the stimuli materials were displayed 
in between 18 distractor questions. This design was imple-
mented to help mask the purpose of the study and minimize 
demand effects.
3.3  Stimuli materials
The treatment stimuli consisted of DFN materials about 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, because they are the 
most recent major US Presidential candidates to date. Trump 
will also very likely run for re-election in 2020, and Clinton 
continues to flirt with the possibility of running again. How-
ever, in any event, experimental exposure to anti-Clinton and 
anti-Trump DFN can shed light on how DFN may poten-
tially affect upcoming elections. Moreover, we followed the 
ecological approach of a related study by Pennycook et al. 
(2017), which entailed using actual DFN. More specifi-
cally, the DFN stories which we used for the three reading 
tasks in each of the treatment conditions were selected from 
and have been identified as fake news by the fact-checking 
website Snopes.com. However, we completely made up the 
DFN Facebook posts used as the final priming stimuli in 
the treatment conditions (viz., the ones displayed for 5 s), to 
introduce new DFN information to participants.
All of the anti-Clinton and anti-Trump DFN Facebook 
posts featured images of the candidates appearing dour and 
surly along with sensationalistic headlines. These include 
for example, (Hillary Caught On Tape Laughing About 
Irma “Wiping Out All Of Those Florida Hillbillies”), and 
(Trump To Deport California Democratic State Senator’s 
Family Because They Are “All Illegals”). The anti-Clinton 
DFN short online articles featured libelous headlines and 
detailed reports of Clinton’s fabricated ridicule of Hurricane 
Irma victims and involvement in a pay-to-play scheme. The 
anti-Trump DFN short online articles presented defama-
tory headlines and respectively detailed reports of Trump’s 
fabricated executive order for mass deportations of undocu-
mented immigrants and ratification of a tax bill that would 
negatively impact firefighters, first-responders, and unions. 
Additionally, all DFN materials were made to resemble real-
istic Facebook news feed posts or website articles to enhance 
ecological validity. The dates of these materials were also 
changed to the week of recruitment, and their displayed pop-
ularity metrics were bolded and increased to make the posts 
and articles appear recent and popular, and thus ostensibly 
more credible.
Furthermore, since the two treatment conditions con-
tained distinct sets of DFN about opposite candidates, their 
potential main effects are on different target attitudes, and 
hence cannot be compared with each other. There is also a 
possibility that differences in perceptions of DFN believ-
ability could result from the anti-Clinton DFN materials 
being more or less convincing than the anti-Trump ones, 
despite both sets being equally partisan. Therefore, we cre-
ated a control condition consisting of three Facebook news 
feed posts and two web-articles collected from legitimate 
press outlets that included Rolling Stone and NBC News. 
These materials featured non-political real news headlines 
and reports about sports, music, and a contaminated lettuce 
scare (see “Appendix” for examples of the materials used 
for each condition).
3.4  Outcome measures
3.4.1  Candidate evaluations
Using a six-point forced-choice response scale (1 = very neg-
ative, 6 = very positive), participants were asked to indicate 
their “opinion/impression” of two major Democrats [sc., 
Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama) and two major Republicans 
[sc., Donald Trump, Paul Ryan]. The average was (M = 3.1, 
SD = 1.7) for Clinton and (M = 2.8, SD = 1.8) for Trump.
3.4.2  Candidate voter choice
Participants were asked: “If you could vote for Presi-
dent today, which one of the following options would 
you choose?”, and presented with the following response 
options: (1) Hillary Clinton, (2) Donald Trump, (3) Third 
Party Candidate (e.g., Green Party or Libertarian Party), and 
(4) Would Not Vote. Of these options, 34.1% of participants 
selected Clinton and 29.9% selected Trump. These meas-
ures were used to create two dummy variables: Votes for 
Clinton and Votes from Trump. It should be noted that these 
variables reflect measures for behavioral intentions rather 
than actual behaviors. Nonetheless, while certainly limited, 
voting intents are well established and strong predictors for 
voting (Gutsche et al. 2014; Vaske and Donnelly 1999).
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3.5  Mediator and moderator variables
3.5.1  News message believability
Using a six-point forced-choice response scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 6 = strongly agree), participants were asked to 
select the extent which they agreed that all of the Facebook 
newsfeed headlines and online news articles presented to 
them were (1) Credible and (2) Trustworthy. These meas-
ures were averaged to create a composite variable: [M = 3.4, 
SD = 1.3, r(551) = 0.96, p < 0.001].
3.5.2  Partisan ideology
Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed 
on a six-point forced-choice response scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 6 = strongly agree) with six self-developed state-
ments—three of which were reversed coded. Some of 
these statements included the following. “People should 
be responsible for paying for their own healthcare and not 
expect the government to fund it”. “Welfare makes people 
lazy and unwilling to work”. These measures were averaged 
to create a composite variable (M = 3.0, SD = 1.1, a = 0.79), 
which denotes a left- to right-wing ideological continuum. 
Specifically, low, middle, and high scores, respectively, rep-
resent politically leftist, centrist, and conservative orienta-
tions. While party affiliation was measured, the composite 
variable above was selected as the proxy for partisanship, 
because it captures a more precise and nuanced measure of 
participants’ political belief and attitudinal orientation and 
strength than a simple categorical party variable.
3.6  Covariates
In addition to the demographic variables reported earlier, the 
political psychographic variables below have been consist-
ently found to modulate the impact of news media on candi-
date evaluations and voter support (Moy et al. 2016; Newton 
2019). They were thus measured as follows and controlled 
for in the analyses.
3.6.1  Political interest
This was measured via a question on prior voting, as this 
is indicative of political interest. Specifically, participants 
were asked whether they voted in the 2016 US Presidential 
Election. 88% reported having voted and 12% reported that 
they did not vote.
3.6.2  Party affiliation
Participants were shown a six-item list and asked to 
select which political party they “most identified with and 
supported”. 31.6% identified as Republicans, 37.3% as Dem-
ocrats, 5.8% as Libertarians, 1.2% as Green, 6.7% as Other, 
and 17.4% as none.
3.6.3  Political knowledge
Participants were asked to answer five multiple choice test 
questions on general politics knowledge unrelated to the 
study. Some of these included the following: “What body 
of government is tasked with interpreting the constitution-
ality of a piece of legislation (i.e., law)?” “Which of the 
following sectors does the US government spend the most 
money on?” “What was one of the original reasons given by 
the Bush Administration for invading Iraq in 2003?” Correct 
responses were coded 1 and 0 otherwise, and then summed 
to create an additive index (M = 2.4, SD = 1.3).
The following media selective-consumption measures 
were taken to partly control for the potential recency and 
ceiling effects caused by DFN or DFN corrections that relate 
to the aforementioned treatment conditions, and that par-
ticipants may have encountered prior to this experiment. 
Using a five-point response scale (1 = never, 5 = very often), 
participants were asked to indicate how often they received 
news from the five major television news organizations (Fox 
News, ABC News, CBS News, MSNBC, CNN). These meas-
ures were averaged to create a composite variable for Tel-
evision News Consumption (M = 2.8, SD = 0.96, a = 0.81). 
Participants were also asked to indicate their weekly usage 
of Facebook (M = 4.1, SD = 1.2) and Twitter (M = 2.6, 
SD = 1.6). Finally, participants were asked to indicate how 
often they received news from Breitbart News (M = 4.1, 
SD = 1.2) and InfoWars (M = 2.6, SD = 1.6), which are 
possibly the most popular and prominent disseminators of 
political DFN (Friedersdorf 2017; Hayden 2018).
4  Results
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) tests were conducted 
to examine the direct effects of DFN exposure on candi-
date evaluations and voter support (H1), with the meas-
ured demographic, mediator-moderator, and covariates 
entered as controls. The first set of ANCOVA tests com-
pared differences between the anti-Clinton DFN treatment 
and control groups. Results showed no significant main 
effect of the treatment condition on evaluations of Clinton 
(Mtreatment = 3.12, SD = 1.7, Mcontrol = 3.15, SD = 1.6) F(1, 
384) = 0.285, p = 0.59, nor on intentions to vote for Clinton 
(Mtreatment = 0.33, SD = 1.4, Mcontrol = 0.34, SD = 1.4) F(1, 
384) = 0.359, p = 0.55. The second set of ANCOVA tests 
compared differences between the anti-Trump DFN treat-
ment and control groups. The results showed no signifi-
cant main effect of the treatment condition on evaluations 
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of Trump (Mtreatment = 2.93, SD = 1.9, Mcontrol = 2.93, 
SD = 1.8) F(1, 367) = 0.228, p = 0.68. nor on intentions to 
vote for Trump (Mtreatment = 0.31, SD = 0.46, Mcontrol = 0.31, 
SD = 0.46) F(1, 367) = 0.139, p = 0.71. These results are all 
consistent with the predictions for H1.
To examine whether the perceived believability of the 
anti-Clinton DFN messages was moderated by partisan ide-
ology (H2), we employed Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS model 
1 with 5000 bootstrap estimates for the construction of 95% 
confidence intervals (CLs). This multiple linear regression-
based test is suitable for examining interactions between 
experimental independent variables and continuous inde-
pendent variables. Here, anti-Clinton DFN exposure was 
entered as the predictor variable with the control condition 
functioning as the reference group (coded as 1 = treatment 
condition, 0 = control condition). Partisan ideology and 
news believability were respectively entered as the modera-
tor and outcome variables, and the measured demographic 
and covariates were entered as controls. The interaction 
between anti-Clinton DFN exposure and partisanship on 
news believability was significant (β = 0.19, SE = 0.05, 
t = − 3.91, p < 0.001). To probe this interaction further, val-
ues of the moderator were sorted into three groups using a 
sample mean, as well as plus and minus one standard devia-
tion from the mean. The three groups were represented as 
low, middle, and high on the moderator, which, respectively, 
correspond to leftist, centrist, and right-wing ideological 
orientations. An effect of anti-Clinton DFN exposure on 
news believability was significant at the low levels of parti-
sanship (B = − 0.87, bootstrap SE = 0.07; [CL] = [− 1.028, 
− 0.7219], p < 0.001), middle levels (B = − 0.65, bootstrap 
SE = 0.05; [CL] = [− 0.7668, 0.5411], p < 0.001) and high 
levels (B = − 0.43, bootstrap SE = 0.08; [CL] = [− 0.5962, 
− 0.2692], p < 0.001), These negative beta coefficients indi-
cate that relative to leftists and centrists, politically con-
servative participants assigned to the anti-Clinton DFN 
treatment group were more likely to believe in the trustwor-
thiness and credibility of the DFN materials shown to them. 
These results lend support for H2.
To test H3, we employed the same moderation proce-
dure as above, but entered anti-Trump DFN vs. control as 
the predictor variable (coded as 1 = treatment condition, 
0 = control condition). As expected, the interaction between 
anti-Trump DFN exposure and partisanship was insignifi-
cant (β = 0.01, bootstrap SE = 0.12, t = 0.0972, p = 0.92). 
This suggests that leftists were no more likely than con-
servatives to accept the anti-Trump DFN messages as accu-
rate. Additionally, one-way ANOVA tests conducted on the 
individual samples for each of the treatment groups showed 
that anti-Clinton DFN materials were found significantly 
more believable by Republicans (M = 3.09, SD = 1.4) than 
Democrats (M = 2.54, SD = 1.4), F(1, 122) = 4.35, p = 0.03. 
Furthermore, the anti-Trump DFN materials were generally 
but not significantly believed more by Democrats (M = 3.43, 
SD = 1.5) than Republicans (M = 3.01, SD = 1.5), F(1, 
117) = 2.03, p = 0.15. These results are all consistent with 
the predictions for H3.
To test H4, a moderated-mediation test was conducted 
using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (model 14) with 
10,000 bootstrap estimates for the construction of 95% 
CLs. In this case, we entered anti-Clinton DFN treatment 
vs. control group as the predictor (X), news believability 
as the mediator (M), partisan ideology as the moderator 
(V), and evaluations of Clinton as the dependent variable 
(Y). All other demographic and covariate measures were 
entered as controls. Results showed that the expected inter-
action between partisan ideology and perceived news believ-
ability on evaluations of Clinton was significant (B = 0.11, 
bootstrap SE = 0.04; [CL] = [0.0207, 0.2048], p = 0.01). 
Additionally, the test yielded a significant moderated-
mediation index of − 0.07 bootstrap SE = 0.03; with a 95% 
bootstrap [CL] = [− 0.1368, − 0.0158]. Notably, the con-
ditional indirect effect(s) of X on Y were insignificant for 
leftists (B = 0.04, bootstrap SE = 0.05; [CL] = [− 0.0636, 
0.1530]) and centrists (B = − 0.04, bootstrap SE = 0.04; 
[CL] = [−  0.1325, 0.0510]), but were significant for 
right-wing ideologues (B = − 0.12, bootstrap SE = 0.06; 
[CL] = [− 0.2429, − 0.0070]). These results can be inter-
preted as suggesting that following exposure to anti-Dem-
ocrat DFN, conservatives were more likely to believe the 
DFN messages. This, in turn, significantly decreased their 
evaluation of the corresponding Democratic candidate. 
Next, we repeated this test with intentions to vote for Clin-
ton entered as the dependent variable. Here, the expected 
interaction between partisan ideology and perceived news 
believability on intentions to vote for Clinton was insignifi-
cant (B = − 0.001, bootstrap SE = 0.10; [CL] = [− 0.2054, 
0.2028], p = 0.99), as was the moderated-mediation 
index of 0.00 bootstrap SE = 0.07; with a 95% bootstrap 
[CL] = [− 0.1501, 0.1560]. These results lend partial sup-
port for H4.
To test H5, we employed the same moderated-mediation 
test as above (i.e., PROCESS Model 14), but entered anti-
Trump DFN vs. control as the predictor variable and evalu-
ations of Trump as the dependent variable. As predicted, the 
interaction effect between partisan ideology and perceived 
news believability on evaluations of Trump was insignificant 
(B = 0.06, bootstrap SE = 0.10; [CL] = [− 0.1422, 0.2691], 
p = 0.54), as was the moderated-mediation index of − 0.06 
bootstrap SE = 0.10; with a 95% bootstrap [CL] = [− 0.2976, 
0.1322]. Additionally, the interaction effect between partisan 
ideology and perceived news believability on intentions to 
vote for Trump was also insignificant (B = − 0.19, bootstrap 
SE = 0.17; [CL] = [− 0.5337, 0.1398], p = 0.25), as was the 
moderated-mediation index of 0.20 bootstrap SE = 0.18; 
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with a 95% bootstrap [CL] = [− 0.1386, 0.5678]. These 
results lend support for H5.
Finally, whilst not part of our hypotheses, we also ran a 
partial correlation test between partisan ideology and politi-
cal knowledge across the entire sample, whilst controlling 
for the demographic and other covariate measures. The 
results showed a significant negative association, indicating 
that conservative participants were more likely than leftists 
and centrists to get lower scores on our political knowledge 
test r(538) = − 0.16, p < 0.001). Conservatives were also 
more likely to regularly selectively consume news from 
Brietbart News r(538) = 0.18, p < 0.001), and less likely 
to selectively consume news from mainstream television 
news networks r(538) = − 0.12, p = 0.005). In the following 
section, we will discuss how these findings relate and help 
to additionally explain the empirical regularities reviewed 
above.
5  Discussion
According to extensive frame and priming theory research, 
the way in which news is presented (i.e., a news report’s 
hedonic tone and message framing) may considerably 
shape the ways that audiences construct and/or employ 
their cognitive-affective schemas of a given attitude object. 
This can then prime and direct people’s decisions on sub-
sequent-related judgment tasks (Baumgartner and Wirth 
2012; Borah 2011; Gibbons et al. 2005; Kim and McCombs 
2007; Lecheler and De Vreese 2011). In relation to this, both 
misleading and biased news reports framed in overtly and 
negatively emotive messages, as well as subtle misinforma-
tion in news headlines, can affect and guide people’s beliefs, 
attitudes, and judgments (Arendt 2013; Balmas and Sheafer 
2010; Chang 2001; Ecker et al. 2014; Johansen and Joslyn 
2008). Hence, given the propagandistic and emotionalized 
messages and tone of political DFN content, and consider-
ing the ease by which it can be spread to large numbers 
of people through social media, public concerns over its 
impact on contemporary democratic elections are certainly 
warranted and understandable. However, the aforementioned 
extensive research also consistently shows that, especially 
with regards to political news, media effects are largely 
dependent on various reading contexts and individual-level 
characteristics such as, in particular, news message believ-
ability and partisanship (Arpan and Raney 2003; Moy et al. 
2016; Newton 2019). The aim of this study was, therefore, 
to first test whether everything else being equal, exposure 
to DFN has direct negative effects on candidate evaluations 
and voter support. And second, to test if the effects of this 
exposure are indirectly enhanced or abated via an interaction 
between news message believability and partisan ideology. 
Two distinct experimental conditions were employed, which 
consisted of exposure to DFN materials featuring negatively 
valenced emphasis frames of the recent major US Presiden-
tial candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.
Regarding our first research objective, and consistent with 
predictions, the findings showed that exposure to DFN had 
no direct effect on evaluations of or intentions to votes for 
either candidate. Despite our controls for regular selective 
consumption of popular legitimate and fake news media 
products, and partial introduction of novel DFN informa-
tion, these null results could be due to participants already 
knowing that some of the claims about the candidates are 
false. However, it is also possible that most participants were 
just not fooled and thus not influenced by the DFN materials, 
irrespective of whether or not they had such prior knowl-
edge. A major reason for this is that people are not blank 
slates, and instead come equipped with varying cognitive 
resources, biases, and sociopolitical influences that they can 
draw on to process incoming news information. This is par-
ticularly the case for people who are 25 or older (e.g., such 
as our participants), as by this stage, they are typically fully 
developed adults with crystalized political positions and 
belief systems. Coincidingly, the capacity for news frames 
and primes to induce changes in political beliefs and atti-
tudes can be strongly shielded against by an individual’s 
pre-existing political attitudes and level of political interest 
(Lecheler and De Vreese 2011; Moy et al. 2016). Indeed, and 
although we did not present the stats for the sake of parsi-
mony and narrative cohesion, our ANCOVA tests repeatedly 
showed that partisan ideology and political interest had sig-
nificant and strong main effects on candidate evaluations and 
voter support for both Clinton and Trump. This gives some 
indication that participants’ political predispositions helped 
to mitigate the potential influence of the DFN treatment 
materials that did not align with their partisan orientations.
Furthermore, there is evidence that Americans on aver-
age distrust DFN sites, and the vast majority of Americans 
still consume and depend on the traditional press outlets for 
credible political news information (Pennycook and Rand 
2018). This incredulity towards DFN sites and reliance on 
legitimate news sources can guard said audiences from the 
undue influence of DFN content, by, for instance, exposing 
them to more trustworthy and nuanced coverage of com-
plex issues, or by disproving fake news claims (Nelson and 
Taneja 2018). To this point, our findings showed that the 
majority of participants also did not trust the accuracy of the 
DFN materials which they were shown. The majority of par-
ticipants also did not trust the accuracy of the DFN materials 
which they were shown. All this suggests that, on average, 
just because people are exposed to DFN does not mean that 
they will gullibly accept these as true, or that they are not 
also exposed to real news which can push them to question 
the veracity of the DFN information. Additionally, DFN is 
still a recent phenomenon that is largely confined to fringe 
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websites visited by quite small and primarily very conserva-
tive audiences (Guess et al. 2018). Though again for the sake 
of parsimony we did not present the figures, we also found 
that only a small proportion of our sample regularly selec-
tively attended to the prominent DFN purveyors Brietbart 
News and InfoWars, and these participants were strongly 
right-wing. Now, it is certainly possible that our limited 
one-shot experiment simply failed to capture what are oth-
erwise plausible and significant main DFN exposure effects. 
However, we argue that taken together, all the interrelated 
factors and findings discussed above help to better explain 
why neither of the DFN treatment conditions induced direct 
aggregate effects on the candidate preferences of our diverse 
and fairly large treatment samples.
Regarding our secondary research objective, the interac-
tion between DFN believability and partisan ideology did 
negatively affect evaluations of Clinton amongst conserva-
tive participants only. However, this moderated-mediated 
process did not significantly affect voting intentions for 
Clinton. Finally, the aforementioned interaction did not 
enhance the effects of the anti-Trump DFN treatment con-
dition on evaluations of or voter support for Trump, which 
suggests that in these outcomes, there were no differences 
between leftists and conservatives. Overall, these findings 
are largely consistent with predictions and corroborate with 
recent studies, showing that even though people generally 
show a tendency to believe DFN about candidates from par-
ties opposite to their own, belief susceptibility to DFN is 
predominantly a pronounced pathology of the right (Allcott 
and Gentzkow 2017; Guess et al. 2018; Mele et al. 2017; 
Pennycook and Rand 2019).
Furthermore, our findings suggest that compared to left-
ists, conservatives more regularly consumed news from the 
DFN outlet Brietbart News; less regularly consumed news 
from major television news networks; and had lower levels 
of general political knowledge. It can be partially inferred 
from these and the other findings discussed that during 
instances of exposure to DFN about a rival candidate, con-
servatives are less likely to have relevant accurate or counter 
information ready at their disposal. They are, therefore, more 
likely to automatically rely on heuristic cues and gut feelings 
to process the presented information. The end result being a 
greater acceptance and incorporation of the communicator 
prescribed judgements and interpretations into their existing 
partisan schema networks. By this same token, conservatives 
would also be more motivated and likely to reject the claims 
of DFN content with opinion-challenging information. In 
contrast, leftists are prone to employing systematic process-
ing when assessing political stimuli (Jost and Krochik 2014; 
Pennycook and Rand 2019). This enables them to draw on 
their relevant and often more accurate stores of knowledge 
when considering the veracity of DFN content, such that 
they are better able to discern fake news about candidates 
that are congenial or uncongenial to their partisan beliefs 
and attitudes. And so, their subsequent evaluations of and 
decisions to vote or not to vote for a particular candidate are 
considerably less likely to be influenced by DFN. Whilst 
mode of cognitive processing was not measured by this 
study, the results are highly consistent with a growing body 
of experimental research on the ideological asymmetries in 
cognitive processing styles (e.g., Jost and Krochik 2014; 
Pennycook and Rand 2019; Shook and Fazio 2009).
In sum, this study contributes novel experimental evi-
dence that extends the current research on DFN and dem-
ocratic elections. Like this nascent research (e.g., Allcott 
and Gentzkow 2017; Guess et al. 2018; Nelson and Taneja 
2018), our findings indicate that people’s political predis-
positions strongly orient candidate evaluations and voting 
preferences, but these predispositions are currently unlikely 
to be meaningfully altered by attention to DFN. Instead, the 
effects of consuming DFN through either social media or 
dedicated fraudulent news sites seem likelier to be that of 
just confirming and reinforcing people’s pre-existing views 
and biases. This may, consequently, potentiate voter turn-
out amongst people with strong partisan orientations and 
allegiances, but our findings indicate that this potentiation 
is not likely to be significant. Hence, if our results and inter-
pretations hold true for the population, they imply that the 
electoral impact of DFN is for now probably quite narrow in 
scope. Indeed, in the large majority of times, DFN consump-
tion and sharing could simply function as echo-chamber and/
or venting mechanisms that allow online users—especially 
far-right ones, to get validation for their longstanding views 
and express their sociopolitical grievances to anyone that 
will listen. Moreover, such dispositional views and griev-
ances have been most probably induced during their forma-
tive years via interactions with the traditional primary agents 
of political socialization, and cultivated thereafter. Thus, 
here, we also postulate that selective attention to DFN is pos-
sibly a symptom rather than a cause of ongoing ideological 
polarization. That said, this study is exploratory in nature, 
and so, the processes, inferences, and explanations outlined 
should be tested in future research.
6  Limitations
This study has strengths in its between-subject design with 
a control condition, cross-sectional treatment samples, and 
robust covariate controls. The web-survey format, realistic 
social media and online news simulations, and non-labora-
tory setting also combined to enhance this study’s ecologi-
cal validity. Nevertheless, due to the political nature of the 
questionnaire, this study’s results are susceptible to a social 
desirability response bias. Additionally, even though the 
treatment stimuli were masked as reading tasks and placed 
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
in between several distractor questions, participants were 
made to directly attend to the DFN materials. Therefore, 
there is a possibility that some participants realized the pur-
pose of the study and corrected their biases when answering 
the outcome measures. Also, like all one-shot media experi-
ments, this study cannot gage longitudinal effects, and it may 
be that DFN exposure directly affects attitude and behavio-
ral intent changes after multiple sessions and/or at different 
dosage thresholds. Thus, research utilizing a longitudinal 
or repeated-measures design, varying but subliminal or less 
obvious DFN exposure conditions, and implicit attitudinal 
measures are needed to verify the findings from this explora-
tory research.
Finally, Trump and Clinton were the most disliked can-
didates in US polling history, and both were viewed almost 
equally negatively by our participants. Hence, DFN exposure 
may affect stronger changes in attitudes and voting intentions 
towards less well-known and polarizing candidates. Addi-
tionally, this study only focused on DFN related specifically 
to US candidate presentations, and so cannot speak to the 
potential electoral impact of DFN in other countries; nor, 
to the effects of DFN about hot-topic political issues and 
policies—which may have a more potent influence on voter 
decisions. Therefore, DFN should continue to be viewed 
with concern and researched in other national and politi-
cal contexts, particularly in nations currently experiencing 
increasing public support for right-wing populism.
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